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A decomposition of aggregate labor productivity based on internationally comparable
data from FAO and Penn World Tables reveals that high labor shares and low productivity
in agriculture are mainly responsible for poor countries’ current position in the world income
distribution. Using a two-sector general equilibrium model, we argue that diﬀerences in total
factor productivity (TFP) and barriers to using modern intermediate inputs in agricultural
production can largely account for the observed cross-country diﬀerences in both the labor
share and productivity in agriculture. Furthermore, our model with agriculture can account
for 89% of the observed aggregate labor productivity diﬀerences across countries, performing
much better than a one-sector growth model with the same exogenous diﬀerences in TFP.
Keywords: Agriculture, Land, Subsistence, Intermediate Input, Barriers, Productiv-
ity, International Comparisons.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O4, O1.1 Introduction
This paper examines the role of agriculture in accounting for international diﬀerences in
output per worker. To see why agriculture is important, consider the following facts. In
1985, GDP per worker in the richest 5 countries is 32 times that of the poorest 5 countries.
This is an enormous diﬀerence in aggregate labor productivity. However, for the same
two groups of countries, the productivity diﬀerence in agriculture is even larger: agricultural
GDP per worker in the richest countries is 71 times that of the poorest countries! In contrast,
the diﬀerence in nonagricultural GDP per worker is less than a factor of 4. Despite their
very low agricultural productivity, the poorest countries allocate 90% of their labor force
to agriculture, compared to only 5% in the richest countries. (For a more comprehensive
documentation of these observations see Figure 1 and Table 6 in the Appendix.)1 These facts
provoke two important questions: Why are so many people in poor countries still working in
agriculture despite the sector’s extremely low productivity? And why is agricultural labor
productivity so low in poor countries? Clearly, satisfactory answers to both of these questions
are essential to understanding aggregate income diﬀerences across countries.2
1The data for aggregate GDP are from the Penn World Tables and the data for agriculture are from
the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). See the Appendix and footnote 7 for
detailed descriptions.
2To illustrate the importance of labor shares and sectoral productivity in accounting for aggregate output
















where Yi=Li is output per worker and Li=N is labor share in sector i, a denotes agriculture and n nona-
griculture, and p¤ is the relative price of agriculture. Using the information for the 5 richest and poorest
countries contained in Appendix E and assuming p¤ = 1, consider a hypothetical country that initially ob-
serves the same labor shares and sectoral productivities of the richest countries. From this initial situation
assume instead that this country observes the labor shares of the poorest countries. Then relative aggregate
productivity between the richest countries and this hypothetical country would be a factor of 2 to 1, which is
1The objective of this paper is to provide quantitative answers to the questions posed above
within a general equilibrium framework. At a qualitative level, there is a fairly straightfor-
ward answer to the ﬁrst question: Poor countries have a large portion of their labor force
working in agriculture because they have what T.W. Schultz (1953) called the food problem
– due to low labor productivity, these countries have to allocate a large share of labor to
farming in order to meet subsistence food requirements.3 The central question is, then, why
are poor countries so unproductive in agriculture? Using a relatively standard two-sector
general equilibrium model with subsistence food requirements, we show in this paper that
low agricultural labor productivity in poor countries can largely be accounted for by two
factors: (1) low levels of total factor productivity (TFP) and (2) barriers to using modern
intermediate inputs in agricultural production. The model implies that these two factors can
quantitatively account for the large labor share in agriculture observed in poor countries.
Furthermore, in our model we ﬁnd that diﬀerences in these two factors can also account for
89% of the observed aggregate labor productivity diﬀerences across countries. Our analysis
suggests that to raise agricultural and aggregate productivity in poor countries, it is impor-
tant to remove the constraints to using eﬃcient technologies and the barriers that prevent
farmers from using modern intermediate inputs more extensively.
only 1/16 of the actual diﬀerence between the richest and poorest countries. Again starting from the initial
situation, assume instead that this country observes the sectoral productivities of the poorest countries.
Then aggregate productivity would be a factor of 4 to 1, which is 1/8 of the actual diﬀerence between the
richest and poorest countries. From this accounting perspective, both factors together - labor shares and
sectoral productivity - are essential in understanding international diﬀerences in aggregate productivity.
3For empirical evidence supporting subsistence food requirements, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)
and Atkeson and Ogaki (1996, 1997). Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2001) provide a numerical illustration
showing that low labor productivity combined with subsistence food requirements can generate a large share
of labor in agriculture. Note that this relationship between productivity and labor share does not have to
hold if a country can import food. However, as Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2001) point out, the evidence
is that developing countries only import limited quantity of basic foodstuﬀs.
2Many economists emphasize the importance of TFP in accounting for international dif-
ferences in aggregate labor productivity (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Hall and
Jones, 1999; Prescott, 1998; Parente and Prescott, 2000; and Hsieh and Klenow, 2002). We
argue here that diﬀerences in TFP across countries are also important in accounting for
diﬀerences in agricultural labor productivity. When a country has low TFP, it translates
directly into low agricultural productivity. In addition, there is an indirect eﬀect. Because
of subsistence food requirements and land being a ﬁxed factor in farming, a low TFP level
implies that more labor has to be allocated to agriculture, which results in a lower land-to-
labor ratio and a further reduction in agricultural labor productivity. This indirect eﬀect
explains in part why labor productivity in agriculture relative to that in nonagriculture is
much lower in poor countries.
There is an extensive literature in economic development that addresses the issue of low
agricultural productivity in poor countries. In that literature, it is emphasized that the
major constraints to improving agricultural productivity in poor countries are policies and
institutions that prevent the use of science-based modern farming technologies (e.g., Schultz,
1964; Hayami and Ruttan, 1970 and 1985; and Huﬀman and Evenson, 1993.) In particular,
because modern agricultural technologies are often embodied in some intermediate inputs
such as chemical fertilizers, new seeds, pesticides, many development economists have em-
phasized factor market distortions that reduce farmers’ incentive in using these inputs as
constraints to raising agricultural productivity in developing countries (e.g., Hayami and
Ruttan, 1985; and Timmer, 1988). Cross-country data corroborate with this established
view in the development literature. Using common international prices, Figure 2 documents
3the ratio of intermediate input expenditures to ﬁnal output in agricultural production,4 re-
vealing a systematic positive relationship between the extent of intermediate input use and
agricultural labor productivity (the correlation coeﬃcient is 0.62). While intermediate in-
puts account for 40% of ﬁnal agricultural output in the 5 richest countries, they only account
for 10% of ﬁnal output in the 5 poorest countries.5
Factor market distortions that aﬀect agriculture are pervasive in developing countries
due to government policies that systematically discriminate against agriculture (see Krueger,
Schiﬀ and Valdes, 1991). We examine two types of factor market distortions in accounting
for international diﬀerences in intermediate input use. First, we consider direct barriers
as reﬂected in the cost of these inputs. For example, protection of domestic industries
(e.g. fertilizer production) that often occur in poor developing countries force farmers to
pay more for intermediate inputs than they would have to pay for the same inputs at world
prices. Protection also makes domestic producers less eﬃcient, which raises the prices of their
products. In addition, government policies in poor countries often promote under-investment
in necessary infrastructures such as road and distribution systems, making it diﬃcult to
deliver intermediate inputs to dispersed farm households and eﬀectively increasing farmers’
cost of using these inputs. Second, we analyze the impact of indirect barriers associated
with labor market segmentation. Policies such as restrictions on rural to urban migration
and institutional protection of industrial wages tend to reduce labor mobility between the
4Here, and throughout the paper, intermediate inputs refer to inputs that are produced outside the
agricultural sector (e.g., chemical fertilizers, pesticides, processed seeds, fuel, and energy). So, they do not
include feeds and seeds that are from within the agricultural sector.
5Interestingly, the ratio of expenditures on intermediate inputs to output across poor and rich countries
compare in magnitude to the ratio of real physical capital investment to output observed across poor and
rich countries. (See Restuccia and Urrutia, 2001).
4agricultural and nonagricultural sectors and suppress wages in agriculture relative to those
in nonagriculture (see Rosenzweig, 1988). By reducing the labor cost in agriculture, these
policies encourage farmers to substitute labor for other inputs and therefore are indirect
barriers to intermediate input use.6
In our quantitative exercise, we use aggregate data from the Penn World Tables and data
for agriculture from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.
To our knowledge, the FAO data are the best available for studying agricultural productiv-
ity across countries.7 We calibrate cross-country TFP diﬀerences by using GDP per-worker
diﬀerences in the nonagricultural sector. We measure direct barriers to intermediate input
use by the relative price of intermediate input to nonagricultural output, and distortions
in the labor market by the average wage diﬀerential between the agricultural and nonagri-
cultural sectors. Taking these measures as exogenous, the model generates implications for
intermediate input to output ratios, labor shares and productivity in agriculture, as well
as aggregate output per worker for all countries in the sample. The quantities for each of
these variables implied by the model match well with actual observations in the data. In
particular, our model implies a ratio of 34 to 1 in agricultural labor productivity between
6See Manuelli and Seshadri (2003) for evidence that low labor costs were responsible for the initially slow
adoption of one particularly type of modern inputs - tractors - in U.S. agriculture.
7These data are relevant for our purpose because the methodology of aggregating agricultural goods
follows a procedure similar to the methodology used in the Penn World Tables for the comparison of aggregate
output across countries. The idea is to price a representative and common basket of goods across countries
and convert output valued at domestic prices into a measure of output valued at a common set of prices
(international prices), rendering comparable measures of output that are less subject to price distortions
across countries. Moreover, the data are relevant for international comparisons of agricultural output because
it uses producer agricultural prices, that is, prices received by farmers at the farm gate that exclude charges
related to transportation, distribution, and marketing of products to the consumers. These activities belong
to the service sector and should not aﬀect agricultural measures of output. This is particularly relevant as
service prices vary systematically with development. (See Summers and Heston, 1991).
5the richest and poorest countries, which accounts for about half of the observed disparity
(71 to 1). Regarding aggregate productivity, our model implies a factor of 22 in output per
worker diﬀerences between the richest and poorest countries, while the observed diﬀerence
is 32. Compared to a one-sector model with the same exogenous TFP diﬀerences, our model
with agriculture generates 5 times more output per worker diﬀerences between the richest
and poorest countries.
Our paper is closely related to the literature that uses variants of the neoclassical growth
model to account for diﬀerences in aggregate labor productivity, most notably Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996). The novelty of our ap-
proach is the emphasis on agriculture. We show that accounting for labor shares and produc-
tivity in agriculture is essential for understanding aggregate labor productivity diﬀerences
across countries. Although a vast development literature addresses the role of agriculture
in development,8 we contribute to this literature by quantifying the large eﬀects of agricul-
ture on the aggregate economy and the importance of TFP and barriers to using modern
intermediate inputs in agriculture.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature that uses growth models to examine the
process of structural transformation.9 These studies, however, do not explain the large dis-
parities in agricultural labor productivity across countries. Three papers by Gollin, Parente
and Rogerson (2000, 2001, and 2002) are most closely related to our research. Their ﬁrst
8The development literature is too vast to cite here. See Johnson (1997) for a recent statement about the
importance of agriculture in development.
9See Matsuyama (1992), Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Echevarria (1997), Love (1997), Lucas (1998
and 2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Laitner (1998), Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001), Ngai (2000),
Eswaran and Kotwal (2001), Stokey (2001), Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Yang and Zhu (2001).
6paper seeks to account for cross-country diﬀerences in agricultural labor productivity by
unmeasured labor input and output in home production, and the other two papers argue
that agricultural productivity determines the timing of industrialization and therefore is an
important determinant of a country’s aggregate output per worker today. Our paper is dif-
ferent from but complementary to their research in that we focus on current total factor
productivity diﬀerences and barriers to using modern intermediate inputs in accounting for
international diﬀerences in agricultural labor shares and productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two-sector model
that sets the basis for our quantitative analysis. Section 3 uses a simple analytical example
to illustrate how barriers to using modern intermediate inputs in agriculture aﬀect sectoral
labor allocation and agricultural productivity. In Section 4 we explain how we calibrate our
model and measure barriers to intermediate input use, and then present our quantitative
results. Section 5 discusses several issues about agriculture that we have abstracted from
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Two-Sector Model
A. Economic Environment
Consider a two-sector model with the production and consumption of two goods, agricultural
and nonagricultural. The production technologies in the two sectors take the Cobb-Douglas
form, and consumption preferences are non-homothetic with a subsistence food requirement.
The basic structure and variants of this model are used extensively in the agricultural de-
7velopment literature.10









®; 0 < ¾ < 1; 0 < ® < 1; · > 0;
where Ya, Z; La, and X refer to agricultural output, land, labor, and nonagricultural inter-
mediate input, which may consist of chemical fertilizers, pesticide, fuel, energy and other
purchased inputs. While · is a productivity parameter that is speciﬁc to the agricultural
sector and takes the same value for all countries, A is a parameter related to economy wide
TFP and its value may vary from country to country. Both parameters are assumed to be
exogenous. The non-agricultural production function is,
Yn = ALn;
where Yn is nonagricultural output and Ln is labor input. Accordingly, the subscript a
denotes the agricultural sector and n denotes the nonagricultural sector.
Land in this economy is in ﬁxed supply. Due to this constraint, labor input in agri-
culture exhibits decreasing returns, diﬀerent from the nonagricultural sector. Note that as
much as we would like to analyze the role of capital in aﬀecting labor productivity, this
input is omitted in both production functions. Because neither the Penn World Tables nor
the agricultural data from FAO contain by-sector information on the capital stock, this pre-
10See Hayami and Ruttan (1985) and Mundlak (2000 and 2001) for discussions and empirical justiﬁcation
of the functional form assumption and other properties of the framework.
8cludes the possibility of incorporating capital in our quantitative analysis. In the Appendix,
we introduce capital into the model and argue that, under rather general conditions, this
omission does not aﬀect our main results in any important way.
The production formulations above have two noticeable features that diﬀer from a stan-
dard two-sector model. First, we include an intermediate input (X) as a productive factor in
agriculture. This formulation is motivated by the fact we discussed in the introduction that
intermediate input use varies systematically with development in the cross-country data. For
the production of this intermediate input, we assume that each unit of nonagricultural out-
put can be converted into 1=¼ units of X. Therefore, a low value of ¼ is associated with high
eﬃciency of producing the input. Second, the TFP parameter A aﬀects productivity in both
sectors. This speciﬁcation attempts to capture the fact that factors inﬂuencing TFP, such as
the state of scientiﬁc knowledge, market institutions, property rights, public infrastructure,
and government policies, tend to have economy wide impact. Therefore, the eﬃciency in
agricultural production is linked with that in nonagricultural production.
The economy is populated by a large and constant number (mass N) of homogeneous
households who derive utility from consuming an agricultural good (ca) and a nonagricultural
good (cn). The representative household’s preferences are summarized by the following utility
function,
U = alog(ca ¡ ¯ a) + (1 ¡ a)log(cn);
where ¯ a is the subsistence level of agricultural good consumption, and a is an utility weight
over the two goods. Let the nonagricultural good be the numeraire and pa be the price of
9the agricultural good. The utility function implies that the representative household ﬁrst
allocates ¯ a amount of income on the agricultural good, and then allocates the remaining
income proportionally to the agricultural and nonagricultural goods. More speciﬁcally,
ca = ¯ a + ap
¡1
a (y ¡ pa¯ a); (1)
cn = (1 ¡ a)(y ¡ pa¯ a): (2)
Here, y is the household’s income.
B. Barriers to Intermediate Input Use
As we discussed in the introduction, there are two sources of barriers that may jeopardize
the eﬃcient use of agricultural intermediate input. First, we consider direct barriers in the
market for X that in eﬀect increases ¼; the cost of converting nonagricultural output into the
intermediate input. Hence, a high value of ¼ is interpreted as a high level of direct barriers
faced by farmers in using this input. Second, we examine distortions in the labor market
that in eﬀect increases the cost of reallocating labor from agriculture to nonagriculture. We
represent this cost as a constant proportion of the wage in the nonagricultural sector, µwn.
The no-arbitrage condition in the labor market implies that
wa = (1 ¡ µ)wn: (3)
So, distortions in the labor market suppress wages in agriculture relative to wages in nona-
griculture, giving farmers incentive to substitute labor input for intermediate input.
10C. Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations fLa;Ln;ca;cn; Xg, prices fpa;wa;wng,
and proﬁts for agricultural ﬁrms, such that: (i) Given prices and proﬁts, ca;cn solve the
household’s utility maximization problem; (ii) Given prices, La, X, and Ln solve the ﬁrms
proﬁt maximization problems in each sector; (iii) Condition (3) holds so that households
are indiﬀerent between working in the two sectors; and (iv) All markets clear, i.e.,
N = La + Ln; (4)
Ya = Nca; (5)
Yn = Ncn + ¼X: (6)
3 Eﬀects of Barriers: An Analytical Illustration
Before conducting quantitative exercises, we ﬁrst examine analytically why barriers to inter-
mediate input use tend to reduce labor productivity and therefore raise the labor share in
agriculture.
Using the production function for agricultural output, we can decompose output per













where N is the population size. Recall that the subsistence food requirement is a key feature
11of the model. In this section, in order to simplify the exposition, we consider a special
case when a = 0. That is, the demand for agricultural output is determined solely by the
population’s subsistence consumption of the agricultural good. Then, under this assumption,
market clearing in the agricultural output market requires Ya = N¯ a, where ¯ a is the per capita












































Hence, the model implies that low agricultural productivity requires a high labor share in
farming in order to satisfy the subsistence requirement, regardless of the sources of low
productivity in agriculture. In our setting, low productivity in agriculture can be generated
by low overall TFP A, low land to population ratio Z=N, low intensity of intermediate input
use X=Ya, and low relative productivity of the agricultural technology ·. Moreover, the labor
force required in agriculture to satisfy subsistence food demand increases with the degree
of decreasing returns to labor in the agricultural production function (measured by ¾) for a
given level of productivity.
Equations (8) and (9) also show that the intermediate input to output ratio, X=Ya, is
positively related to agricultural labor productivity and negatively related to the share of
labor in agriculture, consistent at least qualitatively with the evidence presented in the intro-
12duction. The remaining question is: What factors determine farmers’ choice of intermediate
inputs in agricultural production? To answer this question, consider the proﬁt maximization












® ¡ ¼X ¡ waLa
¾
;
where pa is the price of the agricultural good relative to the non-agricultural good, ¼ is
the proportional cost paid by farmers at the farm gate for X, and wa is the wage in the





















So, taking prices as given, the optimal intermediate input to output ratio for the represen-







That is, the intensity of the intermediate input use is determined by its share in production
function, ®, and the price of the agricultural good relative to the cost of the intermediate
input.
If we continue to assume that agricultural output is used solely for subsistence consump-
13tion, we can solve for the equilibrium level of agricultural price pa that clears the market


























Equation (10) suggests two potential reasons for the low intensity of X in poor coun-
tries where distortions are acute: high costs of the intermediate input, ¼ and low agricultural
wage, wa. As we discussed in the introduction, factors contributing to the high cost of the in-
termediate input include government protection of domestic industry and lack of investment
in necessary infrastructures such as road and distribution systems, and factors contributing
to low agricultural wage may vary from institutional protection of industrial wages and labor
mobility restrictions to poor information ﬂows that raise the costs of migration. In section
4, we show that there are systematic diﬀerences in the relative price of intermediate inputs
and in the relative wage between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors across poor and
rich countries.
We would like to emphasize that the use of the intermediate input is a key mechanism
through which the direct and indirect barriers (¼, µ) realize their eﬀects on the labor share
and productivity in agriculture. This can be demonstrated clearly in equations (8) and (9),
by setting ® = 0. Without the intermediate input in agricultural production, distortions
in the relative price of X and in labor markets would have no impact on sectoral labor
allocation and productivity.
144 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we assess the quantitative role of total factor productivity A and barriers
to using intermediate inputs (¼;µ) in generating the observed cross-country patterns in
the agricultural labor share, the intermediate input to output ratio in agriculture, and the
agricultural and aggregate labor productivity. We assume countries are otherwise identical
but in TFP and barriers. We ﬁnd that the model with these exogenous diﬀerences can
account for a large portion of the observed diﬀerences in the labor share and productivity
across countries.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate our benchmark economy to the 1985 U.S. data. The following 7 parameter
values need to be determined: a, ¯ a, ®, ¾, Z=N, A, and ·.
The land to population ratio Z=N is taken directly from the U.S. data. The ratio of
arable land (in hectares) per working age person in the U.S. economy is 1.8. The technology
parameters (A;·) are chosen from sectoral residual calculations for the U.S. economy using
the production functions speciﬁed in the previous section, which results in A = 34;254 and
· = 0:49.
The labor income share in agriculture ¾ is set at 0.7, consistent with the estimates
of agricultural production functions reported by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) and Mundlak
(2001). The elasticity parameter of intermediate inputs in agricultural output ® is chosen
to match the intermediate input to output ratio in the U.S. economy. This implies ® = 0:4.
15Finally, the values of preference parameters a and ¯ a are selected to match two targets for
the agricultural labor share. Roughly speaking, a determines the long-run share of labor in
agriculture and ¯ a determines a given labor share in agriculture away from its long-run value.
We assume a long-run agricultural labor share of 0.5%. The labor share in agriculture for
the U.S. economy in 1985 is 3.2%. These targets imply a = 0:005 and ¯ a = 839. Notice that
our choice for the long-run share of labor in agriculture is somewhat arbitrary,11 however,
several papers in the related literature (e.g. Caselli and Coleman, 2001; and Gollin, Parente,
and Rogerson, 2001 and 2002) have assumed either a share of zero or a lower share than
the one we use. It turns out that assuming lower values for the long-run share of labor in
agriculture would strengthen our quantitative results.
A summary of the calibrated parameter values and targets is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration of Parameter Values to U.S. Data
Parameter Value Target
Z=N 1.8 Land to population ratio
A 34,254 Labor productivity in non-agriculture
· 0.49 Agricultural productivity index
¾ 0.7 Hayami and Ruttan 1985
® 0.4 Intermediate input share
a 0.005 Long-run agricultural labor share
¯ a 839 Labor share in agriculture
4.2 Measuring Barriers to Intermediate Input Use
A. Direct Barriers (¼)
11The share of labor in agriculture in the U.S. economy has continued to fall to less than 2% in the 90’s.
16The FAO data provides information on the prices paid by farmers (at the farm-gate) for
intermediate nonagricultural inputs used in agricultural production (such as pesticides, fer-
tilizers, fuel and energy, electricity and other miscellaneous items). Roughly speaking these
purchasing power parity prices are the ratio of expenditures in these items relative to the
quantity of intermediate inputs priced at international prices. We use the price of nona-
gricultural output as the numeraire (following the set up in our model) and compute the
relative price of intermediate inputs relative to the nonagricultural output for each country.
These prices are reported in Figure 3. There are important diﬀerences in relative intermedi-
ate input prices and the diﬀerences are systematically related to development. For instance,
Ethiopia, Nepal, and Mali report relative prices of intermediate inputs that are factors of 6
and 7 of the U.S. relative price. We interpret these relative price diﬀerences as a measure
of direct barriers to using intermediate inputs, ¼. Jones (1994) and Restuccia and Urrutia
(2001) have used the price of investment relative to consumption as a measure of barriers to
investment in one-sector growth models.
B. Indirect Barriers (µ)
In an environment with perfect labor mobility, wages must be equalized across sectors. As
we suggested in section 3, low wages in the agricultural sector relative to the nonagricultural
sector may account for the low intensity with which farmers utilize intermediate inputs in
poor countries. We investigate this possibility by constructing measures of sectoral wages
across countries using the no-arbitrage condition for relative wages in equation (3), wa =
(1 ¡ µ)wn. Because there is no readily available data set that provides comparable sectoral
wages for a large sample of countries, we use the average product of labor in nonagriculture
17as a proxy for the wage in that sector, and use the relative price of agricultural good times
the average product of labor in agriculture as a proxy for the agricultural wage.12 As long
as labor income shares are constant across countries, as suggested by the evidence in Gollin
(2002), relative barriers should not be aﬀected by the labor share in agricultural production.13
We ﬁnd large and systematic diﬀerences in indirect barriers in the labor market across
countries.14 These are illustrated in Figure 4.
4.3 Quantitative Results
We assume that countries are otherwise identical to the benchmark economy except in their
TFP parameter A and barriers to using intermediate inputs (¼;µ).15 Diﬀerences in TFP
and barriers are taken exogenously. Diﬀerences in TFP are calibrated to labor productivity
diﬀerences in the nonagricultural sector as described in Figure 1 and diﬀerences in barriers
are calibrated to diﬀerences in the relative price of intermediate inputs and in relative wages
between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, as documented in Figures 3 and 4.16 For
12Our model-based construction of the labor market distortion index is very similar to the methodology
used by Mulligan (2002a and 2002b) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002a and 2002b), where these
authors use ﬁrst order conditions to back out the implied distortions in the labor market.
13We use data from FAO and Summers and Heston (1991) on the relative price of agriculture and relative
labor products in international prices to construct our measure of indirect barriers. Similar magnitudes of
barriers are obtained if instead, direct measures of labor products in domestic prices are used.
14While we emphasize in this paper the role of labor market distortions in generating the wage gap between
the two sectors, another potentially important reason for the wage gap is the diﬀerence in average skill level
of workers between the two sectors (see Caselli and Coleman, 2001). However, no matter what the source
is, the wage gap necessarily implies lower labor cost in agriculture and therefore less incentive for farmers to
use intermediate inputs.
15Economies also diﬀer on the land to population ratio Z=N, but as we document in Table 2, the large
diﬀerences in this statistic across countries are not systematically related to development and hence contribute
little to agricultural labor productivity diﬀerences (roughly 1.9% of the variation in labor productivity in
agriculture across countries).
16In this paper, we focus on agricultural productivity diﬀerences, taking non-agricultural productivity
diﬀerences as given. There is a large literature dealing with aggregate productivity diﬀerences, with emphasis
on capital accumulation and total factor productivity. See, for example, McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) and
18every country in our sample, the equilibrium labor share in agriculture, the labor productivity
in agriculture and in aggregate are computed. In comparing aggregate labor productivity we
use the relative price of agriculture in the benchmark economy. Similar results are obtained if
instead a geometric average of relative prices is used as the international price of agriculture.
A. Labor Share and Productivity in Agriculture
The quantitative results of our experiment are striking. Figure 5 reports the results of
this exercise for the labor share, the intermediate input to output ratio in agriculture, and
aggregate labor productivity. In this ﬁgure, the ﬁrst panel reports the agricultural labor
share in the model and the data. The model implies agricultural labor shares that are as
high as those observed in the data. The second panel displays the intermediate input to
output ratio in the model and the data. The model generates intermediate input to output
ratios that are as low as those observed in the data for poor countries. The third panel
displays the aggregate labor productivity diﬀerences relative to the benchmark economy in
the model and the data. The model generates very low aggregate labor productivity as
observed in the poorest countries. These results illustrate the importance of the subsistence
constraint on agricultural goods when countries are faced with low TFP levels and barriers
to intermediate inputs.
In order to summarize the results of the model, we follow Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997) and calculate the percentage of variation in each variable of interest in the data that is
accounted for by the model. The results of these calculations are reported in the ﬁrst column
of Table 2. As suggested by Figure 5, the model accounts for a large fraction of the variation
Parente and Prescott (2000) for excellent surveys of this literature.
19in each variable of interest. For instance, the model accounts for 87% of the variation in the
share of labor allocated to the agricultural sector across countries. The model with barriers
to intermediate input use (both direct and indirect) accounts for 79% of the variation in the
intermediate input to output ratio across countries. By way of generating large labor shares
in agriculture and low intermediate input use in poor countries, the model also accounts of
a large portion of labor productivity diﬀerences in agriculture (64%) and aggregate output
per worker diﬀerences (89%) across countries.




¼ ¼ (1 ¡ µ) No Barriers
La=N 86.6 57.4 70.6 40.7
X=Ya 79.1 24.6 32.6 -21.5
Ya=La 64.2 43.1 54.8 33.6
Y=N 89.4 62.4 62.9 56.3
Decomposition of Ya=La by
(X=Ya)
®
(1¡®) 17.2 2.4 10.2 -4.0
(Z=N)1¡¾ 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
(La=N)¾¡1 18.3 11.9 15.9 9.3
A 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8
The lower portion of Table 2 reports additional information on the decomposition of con-
tributing factors to agricultural productivity (Ya=La). The results show that both TFP and
intermediate input to output ratio have positive eﬀects on labor productivity in agriculture.
The agricultural labor share has a negative eﬀect on labor productivity due to decreasing
returns to labor in farming.
B. The Role of Barriers
Both direct and indirect barriers to using intermediate inputs, namely the cost of using
20intermediate inputs and barriers to labor mobility, are important in accounting for the inter-
mediate input to output ratio diﬀerences observed in the data. When the model is computed
by considering each barrier at a time, 25% and 33% of the variation in the intermediate in-
put to output ratio across countries are accounted for by the model (See columns 2 and 3
in Table 2). When the eﬀects of both barriers are included, the model accounts for 79% of
the variation (column 1). Moreover, when barriers are not included in the model (column
4), the intermediate input to output ratio implied by the model is negatively related to
the observed in the data. In the absence of barriers, the model implies that countries with
high TFP would use intermediate inputs less intensively. As long as intermediate inputs are
important in agricultural production, this prediction of the theory limits alternative theo-
ries of agricultural labor productivity diﬀerences across countries that rely solely on TFP
diﬀerences.
C. The Role of TFP and Intermediate Inputs
To understand the relative contribution of TFP and intermediate inputs in accounting for the
labor share and labor productivity, we calculate the percentage of variance in each variable
that is accounted for by the model in the case where barriers are chosen to reproduce the
observed X=Ya in each country. This version of the model accounts for 78% of the diﬀerences
in the agricultural labor share, 60% of the diﬀerences in agricultural productivity, and 93%
of the diﬀerences in aggregate labor productivity. (See the ﬁrst column in Table 3.) To
isolate the role of TFP, we eliminate the contribution of intermediate inputs by setting its
share to zero (® = 0). The model without intermediate inputs accounts for 48% of the labor
share diﬀerences, 40% of the agricultural productivity diﬀerences, and 58% of the aggregate
21productivity diﬀerences. These results strongly suggests the importance of understanding
low TFP and low intermediate input use in agriculture in poor countries.
Table 3: Percentage of Variation Accounted by TFP and Intermediate Inputs
Model Speciﬁcation













The role of agriculture in the economy ampliﬁes the aggregate impact of TFP diﬀerences
across countries. Compared with a one-sector growth model where output is produced with
the nonagricultural technology only and using the same exogenous variation of TFP levels
across countries, the model with agriculture is able to account for twice the variation in
aggregate labor productivity, that is, TFP diﬀerences alone account for 44% of the vari-
ability in aggregate labor productivity in a one-sector version of our model. Incorporating
agriculture in the environment improves the model’s implication in this statistic to 89%.
Moreover, looking at the range of variation between the 5 richest and poorest countries, the
model implies aggregate labor productivity diﬀerences of factors of 22, while a one-sector
version of our model with non-agriculture only would imply labor productivity diﬀerences of
factors of 4, that is, the model with agricultural production ampliﬁes aggregate productivity
22diﬀerences by a factor of 5 between the richest and poorest countries.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Two features of the agricultural production function in our environment are important for
our quantitative results: the income share of intermediate inputs ® and the land share (1¡¾).
Our benchmark results are based on what we consider reasonable values of these parame-
ters. However, in the agricultural development literature, empirical studies report various
estimates of these parameters, which may deviate from the values we used. To evaluate
the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent parameter values, we consider an alternative set of
values: ® = 0:2 (intermediate inputs contribute a smaller factor share), and ¾ = 0:9 (a lower
land share and therefore smaller degree of decreasing returns to labor);17 recalling that our
calibrated values are ® = 0:4 and ¾ = 0:7. The results in Table 4 show that reducing ® or
increasing ¾ would reduce the contribution of the model in understanding aggregate income
diﬀerences. Although the model is still able to generate a large variability in labor shares
in agriculture across countries, a large portion of agricultural labor productivity would be
unaccounted for and this reduces the extent to which the model can account for aggregate
labor productivity diﬀerences. However, under these extreme parameter value assumptions,
the role of agriculture is still important in understanding aggregate labor productivity dif-
ferences.
Our results are also based on the assumption that the TFP parameter A enters linearly in
17These parameter values can be considered as a lower bound for ® and a high bound for ¾; see Mundlak
(2001) for related discussions and summary reports. Note that the factor share ® in our analysis should not
only include the contribution of fertilizers but also pesticides, processed seeds, fuel, electricity, and other
purchased intermediate inputs for agricultural production.
23Table 4: Percentage of Variation Accounted by the Model with Alternative Parameter Values
Model Speciﬁcation
Variable Explained Benchmark ® = 0:2 ¾ = 0:9
La=N 86.6 73.5 77.9
X=Ya 79.1 111.0 105.1
Ya=La 64.2 53.7 55.8
Y=N 89.4 67.3 62.8
Decomposition of Ya=La by
(X=Ya)
®
(1¡®) 17.2 9.1 22.8
(Z=N)1¡¾ 1.9 1.9 0.6
(La=N)¾¡1 18.3 15.9 5.5
A 26.8 26.8 26.8
the agricultural production function. We evaluate the importance of this linearity assump-
tion by specifying a more general production function of agricultural goods where the TFP












where 0 < Á < 1. This production function is identical to the one described before except
for the parameter Á. For parameter values of Á > 1, the impact of TFP on agricultural
productivity is larger than on non-agricultural productivity, and can be motivated by the
diﬃculties of implementing or adopting eﬃcient production techniques in countries with
varied climate/soil conditions or with varied human capital endowments. Parameter values
of Á < 1 might be motivated by partial substitutability techniques (appropriate technology)
or by low reproducible capital shares in agricultural production.18 The results of this exercise
are summarized in Table 5. The main conclusion from this table is that small departures
18For more extensive discussions of the role of capital in our model please see the Appendix.
24from our linear assumption regarding how TFP diﬀerences aﬀect each sector would not alter
the main quantitative results of the paper.
Table 5: Percentage of Variation Accounted by the Model with Non-linearity in A
Model Speciﬁcation
Variable Explained Benchmark Á = 0:9 Á = 1:1
La=N 86.6 84.3 88.5
X=Ya 79.1 86.4 72.0
Ya=La 64.2 62.4 66.0
Y=N 89.4 81.3 97.0
Decomposition of Ya=La by
(X=Ya)
®
(1¡®) 17.2 18.4 16.0
(Z=N)1¡¾ 1.9 1.9 1.9
(La=N)¾¡1 18.3 17.9 18.6
A 26.8 24.1 29.5
5 Discussion
Our world economy consists of a set of closed economies. Given the large and systematic
diﬀerences in agricultural labor productivity across countries, an important question is the
role of trade in mitigating these diﬀerences. The evidence suggests that there is not a lot of
imports of food products in the very poor countries, so why aren’t poor countries importing
food? A possible explanation has to do with prices of food and distribution systems in
poor countries. Using the 1985 ICP benchmark price data contained in the Penn World
Tables we calculate the price of food (at market exchange rates). We ﬁnd that the price of
food is higher in rich than in poor countries. However, the price of agricultural products
(at the farm gate) is no higher in rich than in poor countries. (For a documentation of
25these observations see Figure 6.) One possible explanation for these price observations
across countries is that food prices include distribution and marketing services. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture reports that for every dollar spent on food, only 20 cents go to
the farmer and the remaining 80 cents go to distribution and marketing charges.19 While
the complete set of service charges may not be required for imports to poor countries, lack of
access to eﬃcient distribution systems in those countries may prevent rural areas to beneﬁt
from the imports of food products.
Our analysis has abstracted from the potential role of mismeasurement in the labor input
and output in agriculture. While FAO is the best data available for international comparisons
of agricultural output as it constructs measures of output from production not expenditures
on food (since most of the agricultural production is not transacted in a market place in
the very poor countries), agricultural output is more diﬃcult to measure in the very poor
countries. Moreover, the labor input in agriculture may be mismeasured. For example, a
rural worker that works a few hours in the farm and most hours in other activities may be
counted as an agricultural worker. However, we argue that the productivity diﬀerences in
agriculture are so substantial that it is unlikely that mismeasurements of output and inputs
would erase all these diﬀerences.20
We have also abstracted from technology choice in agriculture. Poor countries may be us-
ing traditional agricultural technologies such that the marginal contribution of intermediate
19See Adamopoulos (2003) for preliminary work on the role of the distribution sector in explaining the
cross-country price observations.
20Notice that our model accounts for about 50-60% of the observed cross-country diﬀerences in agricultural
labor productivity.
26inputs is low.21 In the Appendix we argue that adding a traditional agricultural technology
to our environment where intermediate inputs are not important would reinforce our quanti-
tative results. The reason is that barriers to intermediate input use would prevent the choice
of modern agricultural technologies in detriment of productivity.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we show that a large portion of the cross-country labor productivity diﬀer-
ences in agriculture (and in the aggregate) is accounted for by a simple two-sector general
equilibrium model with subsistence food requirements and decreasing returns to labor in
agricultural production that features TFP diﬀerences and barriers to using intermediate
inputs in agriculture. Our emphasis on the role of agriculture in development has a long
tradition in the development economics literature. We contribute to this literature by quan-
tifying the role of agriculture in the aggregate economy and analyzing the importance of
TFP and barriers to intermediate inputs in generating labor productivity and labor share
diﬀerences in agriculture across countries. By accounting for an important portion of the
international diﬀerences in agricultural labor share and productivity, this paper provides a
better understanding of aggregate productivity diﬀerences across countries.
Our results suggest a greater emphasis in understanding TFP diﬀerences across countries
as advocated by the work of Prescott (1998), Parente and Prescott (2000), Hall and Jones
(1999), and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). In our model relatively small diﬀerences
21Caselli and Coleman (2003) have studied appropriate technology in a cross section of countries.
27in TFP translates into very large aggregate labor productivity diﬀerences across countries.
Our results suggest that the TFP diﬀerences needed to account for the wealth of nations
today are much smaller once the role of agriculture in development is taken into account.
Our analysis also highlights the cost of government policies that systematically discrim-
inate against agriculture. These policies create factor market distortions that reduce the
incentives for farmers in poor countries to use modern inputs that are crucial for improving
agricultural productivity. These are the same problems that T.W. Schultz (1964) analyzed
almost forty years ago in his inﬂuential work, “Transforming Traditional Agriculture.” Un-
fortunately, our quantitative analysis shows that for many countries in the world, barriers to
transforming traditional agriculture are still pervasive. These barriers need to be removed
before a signiﬁcant improvement of agricultural and aggregate productivity can be seen in
these countries.
28A Data for Agriculture
This appendix explains the construction of agricultural output statistics. A complete de-
scription of these procedures is in Prasada Rao (1993). The main source of data is the Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
Due to data limitations, agricultural activities include agriculture and hunting but ex-
cludes forestry and ﬁshing. Within agricultural activities, only crops and livestock produc-
tion is included because the lack of reasonable cross-country data for agricultural services.
Output is comprised of a large and representative set of commodities, and aggregation is
done using prices. The FAO data have an important advantage: agricultural production is
valued at producer prices, that is, using farm-gate prices that exclude expenses such as costs
of transportation, distribution and marketing.
Using data of N commodities, indexed by i, and M countries, indexed by j, total agri-





where qi;j and pi;j are the quantity and price of commodity i in country j. Hence, this is
a measure of total output in country j prices (currency). In order to obtain comparable
measures of agricultural total production across countries, a common set of prices must be
used. Let ¼i be the international price of commodity i measured in a reference currency








There are two important measures of agricultural output considered: ﬁnal output and GDP.
Final output comprises total output as deﬁned above minus any intermediate agricultural
inputs used in production such as feed and seed. GDP consists of ﬁnal output minus any
intermediate nonagricultural inputs, such as fertilizer, pesticide, fuel and energy. Therefore,















where si;j is the quantity of commodity i used as seed and fi;j is the quantity of commodity
i used as feed. Notice that the prices of these inputs are allowed to diﬀer from the producer
price, that is, the general principle is that all prices are valued at the farm-gate, and therefore,
prices for inputs are the purchase price paid by farmers at the farm-gate including any
distribution charges, such as transportation costs, and any taxes, subsidies and/or bulk
discounts. Agricultural GDP is deﬁned as,




where xk;j and wk;j are the quantity and price of non-agricultural commodity k in country
j. Again, the general pricing principle is that wk;j is the farm-gate purchase price paid by
the farmer.
Both ﬁnal output and GDP are converted in comparable units across countries using
standard methods. These are extensively described in Prasada Rao (1993) and the refer-
ences therein. A general principle of these aggregation methods is the property of country
invariance and transitivity, that is the results of these methods are independent of the po-
litical subdivision of the world and the comparison of two countries is not aﬀected by the
comparison through a third alternative country.
We present the basic aggregation procedure used, the Geary-Khamis (GK) method. This


















are quantity weights. The ﬁrst N equations correspond to the deter-
30mination of international prices for every commodity i, as a weighted average of prices in
the world, and the remaining M equations correspond to the determination of agricultural
purchase power parities for every country j, as the ratio of output in domestic prices relative
to output valued at international prices. A slightly diﬀerent method is used to compute a
comparable measure of agricultural GDP taking non-agricultural input prices into account.
The data is contained in the FAO Interlinked Computerized Storage and Purchasing Sys-
tem of Food and Agricultural commodities (ICS). The output data includes 185 commodities
at a fairly detailed level (although it is not adjusted for quality diﬀerences), 58 commodities
used as seed, and 146 commodities used as feed. Data on quantities and prices are collected
for all benchmark years, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. There are 103 countries in the
sample, representing 99% of total world agricultural production and 98% of the world pop-
ulation. The sample of countries is fairly well distributed along the cross-country income
distribution.
B Solution of Equilibrium















































where la = La=N is the share of labor in agriculture. Substituting (11) into (7) yields the















From the household’s consumption allocation equations (1) and (2), we have






Substituting the market clearing conditions (5) and (6) into the equation above, we have
Ya
La




























































a A(1 ¡ la);
which is the equation that can be used to solve for the share of labor in agriculture, la. Once
la is solved, we can substitute it into equations (11) and (12) to solve for the intermediate
input to output ratio and the agricultural labor productivity, respectively. Equation (10) in
Section 3 is a special case of equation (11) when a = 0.
32C The Role of Capital
Our two-sector model abstracts from capital. We interpret that diﬀerences in labor produc-
tivity are due to diﬀerences in total factor productivity, which we assume to be constant
across sectors but diﬀer across countries. Our interpretation of technologies is conservative
in the sense that the implementation or adoption of newer, more advanced technologies may
be more diﬃcult in agriculture for poor relative to rich countries. However, there is an
alternative interpretation related to the role of capital in determining labor productivity
diﬀerences across countries. In this appendix we add capital to our model to argue that our
linearity assumption on total factor productivity across sectors roughly holds under plau-
sible assumptions of technologies with capital input. In particular we ﬁnd that as long as
the capital share across technologies is roughly the same or as long as capital accumulation
accounts for a smaller portion of labor productivity diﬀerences across countries, our linearity
assumption is conservative in terms of total factor productivity diﬀerences across sectors.
Consider the following modiﬁcation of the production functions for agriculture and non-
agriculture expressed in per-worker form,
yn = ¯ Ak
¯n
n ;
where yn is non-agricultural output per worker, kn is capital per worker in non-agriculture,
¯ A is total factor productivity in non-agriculture, and 0 < ¯n < 1, and






where the lower case letters refer to per worker variables as deﬁned before.
By capital mobility ka=kn = ¯n=¯a(1 ¡ µ). Therefore total factor productivity in the
model without capital and with capital are related as follows:






33Using this equation, it can be readily seen that if ¯a = ¯n then
Aa = ·(1 ¡ µ)
¯ayn:
Moreover, with roughly equal capital shares Aa and yn are related regardless of the source
of yn variation: capital accumulation or technology. If instead, ¯a < ¯n then






As long as the variation in yn is not all coming from variations in capital to output ratios,
then Aa is also roughly proportional to variations in total factor productivity. This view
of cross-country labor productivity diﬀerences is consistent with the work of Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Prescott (1998), and Parente and Prescott
(2000).
D Technology Choice in Agriculture
Our model assumes that all countries use the same technology in agriculture. Here, we argue
that introducing technology choice in agriculture would only strengthen the impact of TFP
and barriers to using intermediate inputs on aggregate productivity.

















where the ﬁrst function is a traditional technology that does not use intermediate input. In
this case, we can show that there exists Φl and Φh, 0 < Φl < Φh; such that that only the
















A · Φh.22 So, a country
with low TFP or high barriers is less likely to choose the modern technology in agricultural
production, causing the country to fall even further behind from rich countries in agricultural
labor productivity. Because we assume that the traditional agricultural technology is less
intensive in intermediate inputs, the same argument applies for the relationship between TFP
and intermediate input use, that is, since low TFP reduces the use of modern technology in
agriculture, less intermediate inputs are demanded by farmers.
E Summary Data
Table 6: Labor Productivity and Labor Shares across Countries
GDP=N GDPn=Ln GDPa=La La=N
Rich 5% 30,497 31,582 12,237 0.05
Poor 5% 941 8,262 173 0.90
Ratio 32 4 71 1/18
Top 5% 30,497 33,711 19,249 0.04
Bottom 5% 941 4,328 138 0.91
Ratio 32 8 139 1/25
Mean 10,904 15,548 3,057 0.43
std(log) 1.08 0.58 1.43 0.97
Li=N =labor share in sector i, a denotes agriculture and n nonagriculture, Top and Bottom 5%
refer to the top and bottom 5% of the countries in each variable (5 countries in our sample), while
Rich and Poor 5% refer to the richest and poorest 5% of the countries in terms of GDP per worker
for all variables.
22A detailed proof of this claim is available from the authors upon request.
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40Figure 1: Labor Productivity across Countries
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Yj=Lj is labor productivity in sector j 2 fa;ng where a denotes agriculture and n nonagriculture. ¤
refers to labor productivity of the U.S. relative to country i. ¤¤ refers to relative sectoral productivity
in country i relative to the U.S.
41Figure 2: Intermediate Input and Labor Productivity in Agriculture




















































































































Labor productivity in agriculture is expressed as the U.S. relative to country i.
42Figure 3: Direct Barriers to Nonagricultural Intermediate Input Use ¼¤






























































































































¤Price of nonagricultural intermediate input relative to the price of nonagricultural output. Relative
to the U.S. ratio.
43Figure 4: Indirect Barriers to Nonagricultural Intermediate Input Use µ¤









































































































¤Wage gap between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. U.S. gap relative to country i.
44Figure 5: Quantitative Results - Model vs. Data



























































































































































































































































45Figure 6: Agricultural and Food Prices (relative to U.S.)
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Relative Per−Worker GDP
PPPi refers to the purchase power parity of i where i = food, agriculture, and nonagriculture.
ExchR denotes the oﬃcial exchange rate.
46